Corruption in Recruitment of Public Sector Jobs in West Bengal: Causes and Consequences

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Abstract: This paper explores the causes and consequences of corruption in recruitment of public sector job in India. Causes of corruption has two sides- supply side and demand side. High competition in the recruitment of public sector job or high educated unemployment rate is the main (direct) cause of corruption from the supply side. On the other hand, high rent seeking activity, high discretionary power vested to the administrator and low accountability of the administrators are the main source of corruption from the demand side. Apart from these, lack of certainty, consistency and transparency in framing the rules and regulations are also the sources of corruption from the demand side. Corruption reduces the probability of getting a public sector job to the fresher candidates. The potential educated youth become hopeless. It will have a negative impact on attainment of educational institution of the youth. The high degree of corruption may break the trust of the common people on government/ political leader (concerned ministers). Through corruption (bribe) huge amount of black money is generated in the economy that may increase inflation, income inequality in income distribution. Corruption reduces the consumer surplus of the government.

Keywords: Corruption, Bribe, Nepotism, Consumer Surplus

JEL Classification Code: K, K4, K42, Z18

Introduction

The role of human capital in economic growth is well established in economic literature. However, proper allocation of human capital is very important for

accelerating economic growth of the country. Any misallocation may reduce the output from the optimum output of the country and also slowdown the future growth prospect of the country. In the mixed economy, with respect to allocation of human capital each country has two separate sectors- one is private sector and another is public sector. In the private sector allocation of human capital is done by the market mechanism. The marginalistic rule is applied i.e., the value marginal productivity of labour is equal to the wage rate. Thus, to get higher wage rate the workers or job seekers have to increase their productivity. Again, the productivity of labourer directly depends on the effort and amount of human capital contained in the labourer. Thus, the labourer has an incentive to acquire more education and training to get higher wage rate in the private sector of the economy. In the public sector, government recruited some human capital for administration and provision of government services to the common people. But the rules of the market economy are not applied properly in case of recruitment of government jobs. In the government job, those who do the similar job or recruited for the similar post get the same wage rate, in spite of the existence of productivity differentials. Thus, within a particular category of job the productivity differentials are not always considered and workers are not paid differently according to their productivity. In case of government services norms for promotional benefit mostly emphasise on experience rather than performance and productivity. Experience of good work surely increases productivity for which workers should be paid more but experience of bad work (rude behaviour in the workplace, lack of seriousness in the job, delayed work, late arrival and early departure from the workplace, engaged in corrupt activity etc.) do not increase productivity rather harm the environment of the workplace and may influence others through demonstration effect, so they should be paid less. As the promotional benefits of the public sector employee is mainly experience based so the in-service government servant has not much incentive to acquire more education and training. In the present scenario the main distinction between private sector job and government sector job is that entry in the government sector job is more difficult compare to private sector job but serving in government sector job is easier than private sector job. So, most of the educated unemployed persons prefer government job rather than the private sector job.

India is a large country with a great variation in geographical area, climate, monsoon, population density, supply of human capital, minerals and social and

cultural activities. These highly influence business and production activity of the private entrepreneurs. Due to Federal structure of India, there is a government at the state level and another government at the central level. Ruling party of the central government also in power in some states and the opposition party at the central level are also in power in some states. But the production and business outlook are different for different political parties. As a result, there are many incentives for the private entrepreneurs in some states and at the same time in other states such incentives are absent. Private entrepreneurs go to those states where they get more incentives. So, employment generation by the private sector is not uniform in India. There are some states where employment generation by the private sector is sufficiently higher in comparison with supply of educated youth population and in some states where employment generation by the private sector is very low compare to supply of educated youth. If the government (taking private sector job and public sector job together) can't generate jobs more or less equal amount of supply of educated youth then we have seen a huge educated youth chase a very fewer number of government jobs. As public sector job is the first preference of all the educated youths. This fact generates a fertile ground for corruption at times of entry in the government jobs. Corrupt politician and bureaucrats always prefer this situation.

According to Oxford Dictionary of Politics, "the term corruption refers to the appropriation of public resources for private profit and other private purposes through the use and abuse of official power or influence. Corruption is the abuse of public trust for private gain; it is a form of stealing and is an example of market failure". According to Myint (2000) "corruption exists when an official transfers a benefit to an individual who may or may not be entitled to the benefit, in exchange for an illegal payment (the bribe). By taking the bribe, the official breaks a legally binding promise he gave to his employer (usually the state administration or a private company) to allocate the benefit to those entitled to it". Following Myint (2000) corrupt behaviour would include (a) bribery, (b) extortion, (c) fraud, (d) embezzlement, (e) nepotism, (f) cronyism, (g) appropriation of public assets and property for private use, and (h) influence peddling. In this list of corrupt behaviour, activities such as fraud and embezzlement can be undertaken by an official alone and without involvement of a second party. While others such as bribery, extortion, nepotism and influence peddling involve two parties – the giver (supply side) and taker (demand side) in a corrupt deal. If corruption in recruitment of public sector

job is found then that must be the corrupt behaviours included in the second group.

This paper tries to identify the causes and consequences of corruption in recruitment of public sector job.

Causes of Corruption in the Recruitment of Public Sector Jobs

Corruption, especially second group of corrupt behaviours involve two party transaction. So, it has a supply side force and a demand side force. Supply side force comes from educated unemployed youths. On the other hand, demand side force generated from rent seeking activity of the politician and bureaucrats, discretionary powers assigned to the administrators and accountability of the administrators.

Supply Side Causes of Corruption in the Recruitment of Public Sector Jobs

High competition in the recruitment of public sector job or high educated unemployment rate is the main (direct) cause of corruption from the supply side. Indirect causes or the factors responsible for high competition in the recruitment of public sector job are: a) as the country develops, some of the public undertakings become privatized that reduces the number of public sector jobs; b) as the country develops supply of educated labour increases; c) less job creation by the private enterprises due to adoption of advance capital-intensive technology; d) service condition of government sector job is easier or better than private sector job; e) high job security, less work pressure in the public sector jobs.

Causes of Corruption from the Demand Side

To find the causes of corruption from the demand side, this paper uses a corruption function as $C = f(R, D, A)$ rather than corruption equation used by Klitgaard (Klitgaard, 1998) as: $C = R + D - A$ (without estimating the corruption function, one should not use its exact form like $C = R + D - A$). In the above function, C is corruption, R is economic rent, D is discretionary powers, and A is accountability. The function shows that if in the country there exist higher opportunities for economic rent (R) then the possibility of corruption will also be higher. Similarly, for higher discretionary powers (D) of the administrators the greater will be the corruption. However, if the administrators are highly accountable (A) for their actions, then the corruption will be less.

Economic rent

In the corruption literature economic rent is one of the main causes of corruption. Economic rent arises when a person has something unique or special in his possession. For example, sweet voice of excellent singer Lata Mangeshkar, batting skill of Sachin Tendulkar, Football skill of Maradona etc. A person who has such a special asset or skill can demand a more than normal price for the skill, earn economic rent or monopoly profit. But how is economic rent measured? To determine economic rent, we have to know, first, what is the next best thing the person can do for his/her living if he/she has not such special skill. Then the difference between his/her income using this special skill and the earnings from his/her next best occupation, is his/her economic rent for this such special skill. Suppose a politician of ruling party is an education minister and the government recruits some teachers for the government school. The minister recommends a candidate for recruitment. The bureaucrat or the officers of this ministry have to accept the candidate and the candidate got the teaching service. The candidate is anxious to have the teaching service. The candidate is willing to pay a price for this special service. Hence, the minister who has some monopoly power in his ministry has a position to acquire economic rent from his clients. A useful approach to find out the amount of his economic rent is to think of what he can earn if he is not a minister. If the next best thing he can do when he loses his job as a minister is to become a taxi driver then the difference between earning as a minister and earnings as taxi driver is his economic rent. In this discussion, the economic deal like bribery, fraud, graft etc. involving misuse of public office as "rent seeking activities." Thus, rent seeking activity of politicians and bureaucrats is a demand side cause of corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs.

Certainty, Consistency and Transparency about Rules and Regulations

Like the 'rules of the game' every economic and business affairs of the 'state' involve some set of rules and regulations that must be certain, consistent and transparent. According to Myint (2000) "rules and regulations are required to maintain a sense of fair play; to prevent disastrous conflicts; keep greed, predatory and other unsavoury human instincts in check; minimize socially undesirable consequences". To establish an accepted moral standard and good behaviour in the economy both citizens and the state have to abide some rules and regulations. Rules to be observed properly, the state must be transparent. Thus, lack of certainty, consistency and transparency

about rules and regulation by the government is a demand side cause of corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs.

Discretionary Power of the Administrators

It is not always possible to devise the fool proof and watertight rules and regulations of the state. For this reason, some discretionary power should be granted to the administrator or regulating authority. Following the example given by Myint (2000), "in a football match, the referee is granted some discretionary powers and has considerable freedom to exercise his good judgment in reaching decisions such as in awarding a penalty kick or showing a yellow or a red card to an offending player". Similarly, some discretionary powers have to be given to the hands of the regulating authority or the administrator to implement the rules properly or to protect any fowl activity of the citizen. In corruption question discretionary power is the opportunity of the administrator and increase corruption activity. Corruption increases through discretionary power of the administrator if he is greedy and dishonest. But if the administrator or the regulating authority is greedless and honest then this discretionary power helps to make proper judgement or helps to implement the rules properly. Thus, for fair judgement some discretionary power set aside to the administrator where rules and regulations are not crystal clear but greedy and dishonest administrator utilize this as opportunity for corruption. More discretionary power vested to the administrator larger will be the scope of corruption and vice versa.

Accountability

To identify the causes of corruption, accountability places an important position. According to Myint (2000) "accountability is the proper observance of rules and regulations, those administering the rules must be held responsible and accountable for their actions". By accountability we mean if something appears doubtful and improper in the process the authorities can be called for to clarify the matter and to take corrective action and make amends, as necessary. Those in charge are obliged to respond to such queries so that doubts are cleared, and remedial measures or disciplinary actions are taken to the satisfaction of all concerned. For example, a college authority collects different types of fees from the students for maintenance and upgrading facilities in the college and to improve the welfare

of students and teachers. But if no receipt is issued for the payment made and no financial statements or information are provided on how the money is utilized, then there is no accountability. If the administrators are not accountable then they have the scope for corruption and if the administrator is highly accountable then there will be low chance for corruption. Thus, lack of accountability of the administrator is a demand side cause of corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs.

Some Evidences of corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs

In recent past, 2016, government of West Bengal, one of the states of India, recruited teachers for students of class nine and ten levels of all government aided schools. A rampant corruption has been done in this recruitment process and it may be called state owned as the then education minister of Government of West Bengal, Chairman of West Bengal School Service Commission and other members of the advisory committee all are arrested by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). So many evidences are found and produced at the honourable High Court, Kolkata, but the investigation and judgement has not yet been completed. Central Bureau of Investigation is investigating this scam. The Kolkata High Court dismissed the service of 877 (102, 618 and 157 in three different orders) illegally recruited teachers[1]. The investigation is going on and the number of illegally recruited teachers may increase to any number. Honourable Kolkata High Court dismissed the services of 1911 number of candidates recruited in Group-D[2] for the schools in West Bengal. Kolkata High Court has also ordered the Public Service Commission to cancel the panel for recruitment of 1500 number of fire operator for the fire service department and preparation of a fresh panel for the same on 23.12.2022[3]. From the news of INDIA POST ENGLISH ii is found that "Tumparani Mondal Parua (30), a teacher in a state-run school at Nandigram in East Midnapore district of West Bengal, committed suicide reportedly out of apprehension of her name being in the list of those teachers who are under the scanner in the multi-crore teachers' recruitment scam"[4]. On 11.03.2023, honourable Kolkata High Court dismissed the service of 785 (22.6%) Group-C[5] candidates recruited corruptly out of total recruitment of 3478 candidates on this panel in the non-teaching post for the government aided schools of West Bengal. These are some of the evidences of corruption in recruitment of public sector job in West Bengal, India.

Consequences of Corruption

Corruption has many bad consequences on the economy. This paper tries to discuss them by building a simple model.

Model

In the era of capitalism, the role of the government is to maintain law and order, defence, provision of some public goods (infrastructure) and services (education, health etc.) to the common people. Any government employs different peoples for providing above mentioned services and for good governance. In production of services, it is not possible to calculate marginal revenue (MR) of a labour, since government services have no market. Therefore, marginal revenue productivity (MRP_L) curve of government employees can't be derived. But a pseudo marginal productivity curve (Sengupta and Ghose, 2010) can be derived by plotting scores obtained by the competitors in competitive examination for government services at the time of their recruitment. To make a clear idea we may take one example. Suppose government invites application for n teaching posts. Government wants to select best n candidates who are most suitable for the service. To select them government, arrange an examination and respondents compete each other to select themselves. In this examination different candidates scores differently and their scores may be a proxy of their productivity. If we order their scores according to the descending order then first n candidates have higher productivity relative to others and they will be selected for the post.

Figure-1

After arranging their scores (descending order) if we plot in a diagram, we get a downward sloping straight line (it is assumed straight line but nothing essentially changes if it assumed to be non-linear) that is pseudo–Marginal Physical Productivity of labour (MPP_L) curve. Since in service production in public sector we can't get marginal revenue of candidates, for simplicity, we assume that marginal revenue is constant for all the candidates, say α (relaxation of the assumption does not change the basic result). As marginal revenue productivity (MPP_L x MR) curve is the demand curve for labour, therefore demand curve for labour is obtained by shifting marginal physical productivity curve by α proportion. So, demand curve is as usual, AB in figure-1. In the public sector wage rate is institutionally fixed at a certain level, say $\underline{W}$. Every labourer supplies their labour services at the existing wage rate $\underline{W}$. Therefore, supply curve of labour is horizontal straight line. In private enterprise, equilibrium is achieved where MRP_L is equal to the existing wage rate. As government does not run into profit motive so this principle may not hold for public service production. In case of public service production at equilibrium point MRP_L may be greater than or less than or equal to the existing wage rate. So, in our example n^{th} labourer may receive a wage rate which is greater than or less than or equal to his MRP_L. But in our analysis, we assume that at equilibrium point MRP_L is equal to the wage rate.

Now we introduce the case of 'corruption' in the model. Corrupt behaviours in the second group like bribery, extortion, nepotism and influence peddling are general form in case of corruption in the recruitment of public sector job. Among this bribery is the main corrupt behaviour. In this model, for sake of simplicity, all corrupt behaviours termed as bribery. Bribery exists when demand for getting the government job is much higher than the supply of such jobs i.e., excess demand for getting public sector jobs (supply side force of corruption) and presence of corrupted government/ Corrupted political leader (concerned minister)/ corrupted administrative officers involved in the recruitment process (demand side force of corruption).

Selection Process, Setting of Cut off Score

Suppose government set up a commission for recruiting 'n' government employees. For that the commission make an advertisement for inviting application from the eligible candidates, the commission also set up the requisite educational qualifications for eligibility to apply. The job seekers, who have the eligibility, apply for the post. Due to high educational unemployment rate the number of eligible candidates

applied for the post, say 'N', must be very high and surely greater than 'n'. During the recruitment process all these 'N' candidates want to select themselves within the list of 'n' selected candidates. The applied candidates can be classified into three broad groups. Group-1 belongs to the candidates who read and practice more and more, who have high self-confidence to select themselves. Group-2 belongs to the candidates who read and practice more and more with the help of some specialized persons (coach) and purchase some study materials, suggestions from reputed study centre or coach which they expect to be helpful to select themselves. They have either high or moderate confidence about their selection. Group-3 belongs to the candidates who do or do not read and practice because they have very low or moderate confidence for selecting themselves neither by their own effort nor by the help of any coach or private tutor etc.

If the selection commission fairly select the n candidates from the N applicants, then the scattered diagram of their scores in the selection test may look like figure 2.

In figure 2, all the n selected candidates (those lying above the cut-off marks) come from either group-1 or group-2. Generally, the chance of a candidate being selected from group-3 is very less (assumed as zero). In the selection process the cut-off marks (Cm) is very important thing because it segregates the selected candidates from the non-selected candidates. The cut-off marks depend on- i) number of vacant posts (n), ii) Number of applicants (N), iii) standard of the question paper used in the selection test (s), iv) extent of corruption (nepotism and bribe) in the selection process (c). Thus, the functional relationship between the cut-off marks, Cm and its determinants is

$$Cm = f(n, N, s, c) \text{ with } f'_n < 0, f'_N > 0, \text{ and } f'_c > 0.$$

The standard of the question paper used in the selection test is not a measurable factor. It indicates hardness of the question paper used in the selection test in relation with minimum qualifications for eligibility. If the questions are hard then Cm will be low and vice versa. Here our focus is on f'_c, it is the partial differentiation of Cm with respect to c. If extent of corruption $\left(\dfrac{\textit{Corruptly selected candidates}}{\textit{total number of selected candidates} (n)} \times 100 \right)$

increases then the real cut-off marks will also increase. For better understanding an example is given here. Suppose m candidates are selected corruptly (m ≤ n). For successful corruption the first step is to isolate these m candidates and second step is to assign them in the selected list in any way. There are many ways to assign them in the selected list. Some common ways are- supplying them the question papers of selection test before examination, instructing them to submit blank answer script and filled up by some expert hand after the examination etc. If out of n vacant post m are selected corruptly then (n-m) vacant posts are available for the fair competition. As the number of vacant posts decreases the cut-off marks for fair competition automatically increases. In this example extent of corruption is (m/n) x100. Thus, cut-off marks directly related with extent of corruption.

Who are trying to select themselves corruptly?

On the basis of willingness to select themselves corruptly the candidates can be classified into three categories. 1) Not trying to select them corruptly. The candidates belong to this group are either very much honest or very much fearful about the corrupt activity or highly self-confident about their selection or amount of bribe required (from prior information or conception) for corruptly selecting him (her) is not permitted by his (her) family budget. 2) Trying but not successfully selecting them corruptly. The candidates belong to this group are not honest, very much opportunist, have not much self-confidence about their selection and the amount of bribe required (from prior information or conception) for corruptly selecting him (her) is just permitted by his (her) family budget, he/she is always trying but do not find suitable bribe taker. 3) Trying and successfully selecting them corruptly. The candidates belong to this group are not honest, very much opportunist, have not much self-confidence about their selection and amount of bribe required (from

prior information or conception) for corruptly selecting him (her) is permitted by his (her) family budget and he/ she has found a suitable bribe taker or any relatives (for nepotism). A suitable bribe taker is that person who has some monopoly power to enter the name of the bribe giver in the final merit panel for recruitment through direct or indirect connection to the recruitment process.

What does happen if m candidates are selected corruptly?

If out of n vacant post m are selected corruptly then it has multiple impact on the society. These are discussed now.

1. The chance of being selected in the final list by a fresh candidate (who do not involve in corruption or nepotism) is reduced from n/N to (n-m)/(N-m). For n < N and m > 0, (n-m)/(N-m) < n/N. That means for the freshers, probability of getting a government job decreases. Assuming the probability of getting a private sector job remain same probability of getting a job (private plus public sector) decrease.

2. If m candidates are selected corruptly then consumer surplus of the society decreases. This can be shown in figure 3.

In figure 3, AD is the marginal revenue productivity curve from marks scored in the recruitment test arranged in descending order of N eligible candidates.

Assuming that rules of market is applied for selecting n number of candidates in the government job. Thus, n is determined from the intersection point of AD with the wage line (which is institutionally fixed at W) i.e.at point C. Now the government (by employed n number of worker in government job) enjoys a consumer surplus equal to ∆AWC, if all these n candidates are selected fairly or according to merit or productivity. But out of n if m is selected corruptly then marginal revenue productivity curve of the selected n candidates will be ABGE (assuming that those are selected corruptly have lowest marginal revenue productivity). In this case 'would be fairly selected candidates' belonging in the BC zone will be replaced by would be corruptly selected candidates. In figure-3, GE part of the marginal revenue productivity curve may start from any point in between FG and its absolute slope may be greater than or equal to GE line depending upon which m candidates (depending upon their scores) are selected corruptly. This line may even start from the point B and ends at E or above, if some of the candidates who would have been selected fairly but due to moderate self-confidence they have selected corruptly.

If all the n candidates are selected fairly the government enjoys consumer surplus is equal to the ∆AWC but if m are selected corruptly then consumer surplus will be (□ABFW + (- □GFCE)) = (∆AWC – □HFCE), as BC parallel to GE. Therefore, government loses a consumer surplus equal to □HFCE.

3. Through bribe huge amount of black money is generated in the economy that may increase inflation, inequality in income distribution.

4. The potential educated youth those who would have been selected in the fair selection but not selected due to corruption will be hopeless. It will have a negative impact on attainment of educational institution of the youth.

5. As more of the educated youth from the richer families (who have the ability to give bribe) will get the public sector job the untold truth becomes 'public sector job is for the offspring of rich parents' -this plays a negative impact on attainment of educational institution by the poor children and reduces the stability of the government in the democratic system.

6. If the degree or extent of corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs is very high then the degree of above-mentioned impact will be also high. That may break the trust of the common people on government/ political leader

(concerned minister)/ bureaucrats. In the democratic system, falling trust on the government may lead to complete downfall of the government provided that the opposition party or court explore the corrupt cases.

What are the remedies?

It is very difficult to stop corruption. Because in case of corruption both bribe giver and bribe taker are mutually benefitted. So, they form a cartel and maximize their joint profit by doing such corrupt behaviours. This is the main reason for non-publishing of corruption fact to media and to common people. In all the countries of the world corruption always exist. Non publishing of corruption fact does not mean that there is no corruption. Thus, the crucial question about corruption is not its existence rather its degree or magnitude. A high degree of corruption can be easily assessed but it is very difficult to prove. Not only India but most of the countries of the world giving and taking bribe both are punishable offence. This legal sanction increases corruption. Once corruption have been done both the activities 'giving bribe' and 'taking bribe' have already been taken place simultaneously. If both are punishable offence, if proved, then both bribe taker and bribe giver form a cartel and maximize their joint profit by hiding the fact any way. Once a corruption has been done both the parties take oath not to disclose it to anyone and corruption will not be published. If giving bribe is not a punishable offence then bribe taking will not be possible because bribe taker has a fear that after the successful completion of desire work for which he has taken bribe, the bribe giver has no responsibility to keep it secret. He may disclose it to common people, media or report it to police. Due to this fear bribe taker will not take the bribe and corruption can be easily controlled.

Some say that heavy punishment may reduce corruption. But I do not agree with this statement. As degree of punishment increases that only increase the degree of secrecy of both bribe giver and bribe taker. It cannot reduce the extent of corruption rather it raises the amount of bribe by adding a premium (for heavy punishment) on original amount of bribe.

Devising any policy for reduction of corruption from its supply side is very difficult because in case of corruption in recruitment of public sector job in the supply side there are very large number of educated and unemployed youths, they are fragmented, they always try to maximize their profit by their own way and they are not connected to the government directly so their activity can't be easily controlled.

From the causes of corruption in its demand side 'rent seeking' is an important factor. Rent seeking activity can be minimized by routine transfer of bureaucrats and political leaders (ministers) from one sector to another sector.

Corruption can be minimized by reducing discretionary powers of the administrator. If rules and regulations of the state are properly defined, certain, convenient and transparent to all the citizens then corruption will be minimized.

If the bureaucrats and political leaders (ministers) are accountable to their higher authority then corruption will be minimized.

Conclusion

From the above discussion about the causes and consequences of corruption in recruitment of public sector job this paper concludes that there are two sources of cause of corruption- from supply side and from demand side. High competition in the recruitment of public sector job or high educated unemployment rate is the main (direct) cause of corruption from the supply side. Indirect causes are reduction of public sector jobs, increase in supply of educated labour, less job creation by the private enterprises through adoption of advance capital-intensive technology, better service condition, experience-based promotion, higher job security, less work pressure etc. in the public sector jobs.

On the other hand, high rent seeking activity, high discretionary power vested to the administrator and low accountability of the administrators are the main source of corruption from the demand side. Apart from these, lack of certainty, consistency and transparency in framing the rules and regulations are also the sources of corruption from the demand side.

Corruption in the recruitment of public sector job generates so many bad consequences on the society. Some of the main consequences are mentioned below.

Corruption reduces the probability of getting a public sector job to the fresher candidates. The potential educated youth those who would have been selected in the fair selection but not selected due to corruption will be hopeless. It will have a negative impact on attainment of educational institution of the youth. As more of the educated youth from the richer families will get the public sector job the untold truth becomes 'public sector job is for the offspring of rich parents' -this plays a negative impact on attainment of educational institution by the poor children and that leads to an uneven educational development of the country. If the degree of

corruption in recruitment of public sector jobs is very high then the degree of above-mentioned impact will be also high. That may reduce the trust of the common people on government/ political leader (concerned minister)/ administrator. In the democratic system falling trust on government reduces the stability of the government and may lead to complete downfall of the government provided that the opposition party or court explore the corrupt cases.

Through bribe huge amount of black money is generated in the economy that may increase inflation, inequality in income distribution, may increase balance of payment deficit of the country.

Corruption reduces the consumer surplus of the government. Government pays more to the corruptly recruited employees than what she receives from them. Thus, common peoples' taxed money spent on some low productive worker.

Any government recruits employees, generally, to produce some services like teaching, health etc. In such services a multiplier, always, exists. A good quality teacher always produces many good students and a bad quality teacher produces many low-quality students. Similarly, a good quality doctor saves many lives and a bad quality doctor kill many. Health and education are two main items of human capital and human capital is the heart of growth and development of a country. Thus, if a large amount of low productive workers are recruited corruptly that may retard growth and development of the country.

Notes

1.   WEST BENGAL SCHOOL SERVICE COMMISSION, http://www.westbengalssc. com/sscorg/wbssc/home (accessed on March 9, 2023).

2.   WEST BENGAL SCHOOL SERVICE COMMISSION, http://www.westbengalssc. com/sscorg/wbssc/home (accessed on March 9, 2023).

3.   INDIA POST ENGLISH, https://india.postsen.com/local/159456.html (accessed on December 23, 2022).

4.   DECCAN HERALD, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/east-and-northeast/ wbssc-recruitment-scam-bengal-teacher-kills-self-1168553.html (accessed on March 9, 2023).

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